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Background
The globalization of economic and business activity appears to be continuing unabated in 
the new millennium. International trade, foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio 
investments and international currency transactions are increasing at an unprecedented 
rate.i This is a phenomenon that is common to all industry sectors across all countries. It 
is a phenomenon that became clearly apparent in the wine industry from the early 1980s 
and has been responsible for a reshaping of the industry’s international landscape. 
Much of the globalization literature over the last decade debates the advantages or 
otherwise of this interdependence at a macro level, where often broad economic, social 
and cultural assessments tend to mask the more geographic, industry and firm-specific 
issues.ii In more recent regional science literature, however, there has been a greater 
emphasis on regional responses to global pressures, the role of clusters within a global 
environment and firm-specific strategies for responding to its opportunities and 
challenges.iii
It is within the context of these regional and firm strategies that this paper makes its 
projections for the wine industry. The international wine industry has undergone rapid 
transformation over the last twenty-five years, much of it in response to the industry’s 
globalization of production, distribution and marketing. This transformation has had both 
expected and unexpected outcomes. Among the more unexpected outcomes has been the 
emergence of regional identity and branding and a redefined role for small and medium 
firms within these regions. These phenomena are explored and speculated upon within 
historical and contemporary contexts.
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For the purposes of this paper, an extensive literature review was conducted in both 
primary and secondary sources. Scholarly literature on globalization theory, cluster 
theory, regional economic development, exporting behaviour and wine history was 
consulted. In addition, numerous newspapers, trade journal articles, and industry 
statistical collections were assessed for data to support the paper’s arguments. The 
author’s previous studies in related areas were also drawn upon for specific innovation 
and export data as well as interview results.iv
Stage one includes historical comparisons between New and Old World wine industries, 
including the challenges and opportunities experienced by each. The second stage of the 
paper traces the evolution of each sector to the current production, distribution and 
marketing environments. This allows for scenario setting which comprises the third stage 
of the paper, wherein the author speculates on the international wine industry’s future 
landscape and its broader implications for organizational reconfiguration across national, 
regional and firm structures.
Brief history - The era of European dominance
Europe’s position in the world of wine has been one of complete dominance for the last 
two millennia. As late as the 19th and much of the 20th century this dominance continued, 
albeit with major organizational shifts and paradigmatic ruptures. In the 19th century 
many European producers suffered in an industry plagued by devastating diseases and 
pests, the most notable being phylloxera.  This root-attacking louse destroyed vines right 
across Europe throughout the 1860s and 1870s, resulting in virtually complete 
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destruction.v It was not until the 1880s when American rootstock was imported and 
grafted that immunity to phylloxera was finally achieved.vi
The American rootstock (ironically a New World cure) provided a turning point for 
European wine producers. Although still facing substantial challenges, including two 
world wars, the Great Depression of the 1930s and continuing pest outbreaks, the 20th
century was primarily one of rapid growth and consolidation of key varieties.vii In 
addition, technological change in both viticultural and oenological arenas was matched 
with quality regulations and a revolution in the transport system. New, rapid 
transportation, in particular, meant that wine drinkers from all corners of the globe could 
now access good quality produce, rather than be subjected in many cases to their own 
localized and often inferior wine. 
A mini-revolution was also taking place in packaging. Traditionally, wine was shipped 
from the vineyard to distributors in casks or tuns (at which point wholesale merchants 
transferred it into bottles for retail sale). By the mid-1900s, however, this method was 
discarded in favour of bottling at point of production. The simple change allowed a major 
leap forward in quality control and supply chain management. Wine-makers could now 
apply the same care in bottling as they had in the product’s making, rather than risking 
inexperienced handling, bad storage and partial or complete deterioration of their 
product.viii
These achievements, together with unmatched growth in global wealth ensured that the 
wine regions of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal experienced unprecedented popularity 
and cultural dominance.ix
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As the industry matured and demand for quality grew, two previously nascent concepts 
were also gaining legitimacy. One was the link between wine science, or oenology and 
viticulture. By the late 1940s the Institut d’Oenologie had been established at the 
University of Bordeaux, with Jean Ribereau-Gayon as director. He was immediately 
joined by Emile Peynaud, the person responsible for putting oenology into practice. 
While many believe wine science and viticultural innovation emerged with the New 
World producers, its systemic organization actually began with Peynaud, who 
encouraged to a degree, product standardization and certainly leading-edge 
methodologies.x Although the French were reluctant to admit it, wine-making was being 
turned from an art into a science and the great Baron Philippe de Rothschild and others 
were helping to ensure this change become entrenched. 
The other concept was that of regulated quality. In France four quality classifications 
were developed. The lowest is ‘Vin de Table’ for non-vintage table wines, followed by 
‘Vin de Pays’ (VDP) for regional country wines from defined areas, and then Vin 
Delimite de Qualite Superieur’ (VDQS) which included wines of a higher quality 
grading. Finally, there is the ‘Appellation d’Origine Controlee’ (AOC) which is the 
highest grading of French wines, where quality controls are applied to all viticultural and 
oenological aspects of the product.xi Similar quality systems in Spain are banded under 
the Demominacion de Origen and in Italy, the Denominazione di Origine (DOCG). 
These quality systems both reinforced and were reinforced by the oenological advances 
taking place across the continent. They were also, to a large extent, self-fulfilling.xii As 
the systems became increasingly prescriptive for growers, wine-makers and consumers 
alike, the regulations tightened. Terroirxiii became more and more critical and the top 
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quality categories such as the AOC, more exclusive.xiv Until the early 1970s the AOC and 
its counterparts in Italy and Spain served their purpose well. Varieties were specifically 
chosen for particular regions, yields were kept low, quality rose and most importantly, 
these regulations had the desired effect at the point of sale, where prices continued to 
inflate and the reputation of the producers climbed . 
By the 1960s and early 1970s most New World producers were still contenting 
themselves with producing bulk wine of variable quality. Although Californian wine was 
gaining some recognition in the international market, it was limited and had many critics. 
Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Chile posed no real threat to Europe. Their 
wines were regarded as mediocre, they had bad press throughout most of the continent 
and their export markets were virtually non-existent. In addition, the reputation of 
European wine was now such that importers had no taste for alternatives. Europe reigned 
supreme.
A Changing Landscape – The Rise of the New World
Four major developments, however, conspired to bring about fundamental changes within 
the international wine landscape. Partly by accident and partly by design, over the last 3 
decades of the 20th century these changes altered the dynamics of the industry to such an 
extent that today’s wine industry bears little resemblance to the one monopolized by 
Europe throughout the last two centuries.xv
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Educating the consumer
The first of these changes was slow to evolve but had a dramatic and lasting effect. As 
the culture of wine drinking became a more accepted part of daily life in traditionally 
non-wine drinking communities its value and acceptability as a beverage also increased. 
People began to take wine drinking, but also its history, origins and varieties more 
seriously. European producers understandably embraced and promoted this cultural 
change. Consumers were taught to recognize the various quality distinctions, were given 
rudimentary advice on the differences in terroir, encouraged to tour Europe’s vineyards 
and indulge in tastings. Most importantly, they were guided in their choice of wines from 
vintage to vintage. Distributors and merchants eagerly awaited news of the most 
agreeable wines from each vintage and bought it in volume to be passed on to their 
equally eager customers. In short, merchants and consumers alike, were educating 
themselves in the mysteries and pleasures of wine.
The taste test
The second development was a direct response to the increasing popularity of wine. It 
was also a direct response to an emerging democratization of the product and the 
determination of New World producers to internationalize their business. In 1976 
shockwaves rippled through the wine world when a blind taste test in Paris (with 9 
French judges) found that the best tasting cabernet and four of the best tasting whites 
were in fact, Californian.xvi This single outcome created the turning point that the New 
World so desperately needed. The international community was forced to recognize that 
at least Californian wines offered a high-quality alternative to the ubiquitous European 
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brands.xvii While other New World producers such as Australia, Chile and New Zealand 
were attempting to capitalize on this development, France, in particular, was determined 
to ignore it. 
Consumer-driven production
The third development, which will be expanded upon later in the paper, was the 
attitudinal response to the revolutionary taste test. Throughout the 1980s and particularly 
1990s, New World producers in California, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Chile increasingly understood that a wine was considered ‘good’ if and only if, the 
consumer actually liked it. Initially the most successful at recognizing this fact were 
Australia and California. After a myriad of market samplings it was found that most 
consumers opted for robust, full fruit, rather sweet flavours. They also wanted wine that 
was good quality, value for money and dependable; that is, if they bought a particular 
branded variety, they wanted its taste to remain consistent.xviii
These requirements brought about a fundamental reorientation in both viticultural and 
oenological practice.xix It was a reorientation that depended heavily on an industry vision 
and the dissemination and uptake of technology.xx New World producers were committed 
to both, albeit in varying degrees. From the late 1980s, Australia, California, South Africa 
and to some extent New Zealand were bringing about a systemic organization of their 
wine industries.xxi The very fact that only now were they officially recognized as 
‘industries’ is testament to this organization. 
In California the University of California-Davis, the American Vineyard Foundation and 
the Californian Association of Winegrape Growers played central roles in coordinating 
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funding, research, information, exports and government lobbying. In Australia it was the 
Grape and Wine Research Development Corporation, The Winemakers Federation of 
Australia, the Australian Wine Research Institute and the Cooperative Research Centre 
for Viticulture, while in South Africa, it was the Nietvoobij Institute for Viticulture and 
Oenology and the South African Wine Institute.xxii At a tangible level, they provided 
advice and practical assistance in all viticultural and oenological aspects from clone and 
rootstock development, virus diagnosis, canopy management and harvesting methods, 
through to hygiene, maceration techniques, blending and quality testing. They also played 
critical roles in wine competitions, wine education, vertical integration, brand 
development and retailing.xxiii
These organizations not only centralized resources, but gave their respective industries a 
sense of unity and common purpose.xxiv  They established targets, set priorities and 
created benchmarks for the entire industry, so that the growth, production and sale of 
winegrapes targeted consumer needs. In short, they created the vision.
Producer-driven production 
In contrast, the attitude of European wine industries, and in particular, the French, 
remained focused on a producer-driven approach. Throughout most of the 1980s and 
1990s Europe’s response to the increasing market penetration of New World varietal 
wine, was to adhere to its legislated quality systems and the concept of terroir, the 
antithesis of the New World approach.xxv Systems such as the AOC had little room for 
consumer input. Every aspect of the growing and wine making process was defined, from
determination of which territories should be reserved for particular appellations, to the 
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grape varieties that could be used, to soil characteristics, to approved oenological 
methods.xxvi
There was a firm belief throughout the last two decades of the 20th century that the New 
World challenge would be short lived.xxvii Many Old World producers believed that if 
they simply maintained their appellations and wines and kept promoting their history, the 
consumers would tire of New World, ‘industrial’ varieties and return.xxviii As one French 
producer stated – “We don’t make wines to please consumers. We make wines that are 
typical of their terroirs.”xxix
Compounding this attitudinal inertia were several structural barriers unique to the Old 
World. Due to a culture of heavily subsidized grape-growing and wine-making, European 
producers found it difficult to adapt to broader markets within Europe, and indeed 
beyond.xxx Often among smaller producers, who had always been paid regardless of their 
wine quality, there was no ready market for what many distributors and merchants 
believed was an inferior product. There was also a lack of flexibility in following 
changing trends, again the result of an entrenched producer-driven approach.xxxi Then 
there was the AOC and its equivalents. As Colman states:
Using the land register that dates from the time of Napoleon, the producers are 
able to geographically delimit the zones from which the grapes must come. 
The grape varietals are also controlled . . . and producers must choose from a 
short list of six accepted red wine varietals. The varietals do not change 
because tradition dictates that this year’s vintage must taste like last year’s 
vintage.xxxii
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Such legislated resistance to change restricted the parameters within which the smaller, 
less prestigious firms could operate. In addition, the AOC had increasingly lost sight of 
its original vision since the late 1970s. More and more, it was dictated to by those firms 
belonging to the most exclusive category. Regulations were altered, conflicts of interest 
were common and the very tenets of the AOC system were continually undermined.xxxiii
Smaller firms were further disenfranchised by these distortions. The fact that most of 
them were small family businesses meant also that their ability to compete for established 
distribution networks and supermarket shelf space was severely limited.xxxiv Their demise 
was to be a symptom of a far greater affliction for European producers. By the end of the 
20th century the wine landscape was changing dramatically. It was becoming obvious that 
a new type of consumer was requiring a new approach by producers, new techniques, 
new marketing, new distribution and production and above all, a new attitude.
Emerging Landscapes
It was also becoming obvious that the New World challenge was not an ‘aberration’ as 
the Europeans had earlier hoped. By the beginning of the new millennium Australia, 
California, New Zealand, South Africa, Chile and to a lesser extent Argentina, had 
established a sustained presence within the global wine industry. In the case of Australia, 
California and Chile, the presence is also substantial. 
New World growth
For example, in terms of grape production (volume) for 2004, California ranked fourth in 
the world, followed by Argentina in 5th position, then Australia in 7th position, South 
Africa in 10th and Chile in 11th position.xxxv Together, these more substantial New World 
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producers account for approximately 22% of total world production, a figure that is 
increasing rapidly.xxxvi This increase is also in contrast to much of the Old World 
production. Between 1991 and 2003 Australia’s production, admittedly from a much 
smaller base, increased by 137%, from 458 million litres to 1,086 million litres. In 1986 it 
was a mere 10.8 million litres.xxxvii In the same period, France’s production declined by 
11.1% and Italy’s by 29.6%.xxxviii
In terms of wine exports, Australia is now ranked 4th in the world, followed by Chile in 
5th position, California in 6th and South Africa in 9th position. Together, New World 
exporters account for 35% of world trade (excluding intra-European trade), a figure that 
eclipses their contribution only a decade earlier. In the early 1990s it was approximately 
14%.xxxix As late as 1999, the figure was still only 19.7%.xl
But the importance of international trade accounted for by New World producers 
transcends these figures. For example, the UK is the largest export market for both New 
and Old World producers. A decade ago, nine of the ten top selling wines in this market 
were from European producers, primarily France. In 2004, this situation was almost 
completely reversed.  Seven of the ten top selling wines were from New World 
producers, six from Australia and one from California. Only three were European.xli
Reinforcing this trend was the New World’s share of the UK market for the first time 
overtaking that of the European producers (48% vs 46%) in 2005, as opposed to 26% vs 
67% in 1999.xlii
In the lucrative US market, the situation is similar. Australia is now the 2nd largest 
exporter to this market, easily outdistancing France at number three and rapidly 
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approaching Italy as the largest exporter.xliii New World market share has also risen from 
16% in 1999 to 35% in 2005 while the European share has fallen from 81% to 61% in the 
same period. Furthermore, if the super premium wine producer price and output 
projections are examined between 1999 and 2005 (an indicator of quality), we again see 
clear trends. For example, there is a price decline of 5.7% for France and 7.1% for Spain, 
while California has a decline of only 1.3% and Australia an increase of 9%. In terms of 
output France has an increase of 22%, Spain an increase of 33%, while California records 
an increase of 57%, and Australia and Chile both record increases of 136%.xliv
Another telling indicator of New World performance over the past decade is its ability to 
combine its consistent quality, wine style and marketing to capture key price points in 
each of these markets.xlv While the major European producers have to some extent 
neglected the more popular (premium) price points in favour of super premium and icon 
markets, New World producers understood correctly that to build a brand image they 
needed to dominate the most popular market segments. To that extent they have 
succeeded. Price points within the $3 to $10 range in the UK, USA, Canadian and a 
number of European markets are now largely the domain of producers such as Australia, 
New Zealand, California and Chile.xlvi
The potential for continued growth in production and exports within the New World 
remains high. Industry vision, a unified approach, strong emphasis on scientific methods, 
efficient distribution channels and innovative marketing techniques are being pursued by 
most New World producers and continue to underpin this growth. Rather than retaining 
the inferior status of the 1960s and 1970s, where they only managed to fill gaps in 
demand (inadvertently left open by the Europeans), New World wines offer a creditable, 
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even robust alternative for consumers. Innovation, quality, uniformity and affordability 
have been packaged into a unique, consumer-friendly product. As a result, wine culture 
and participation have been democratized to the extent that the supply/demand landscape 
is undergoing significant reconfiguration.xlvii
Rationalization and mergers – subterranean landscapes
The rise of New World wine producers and their challenge to the growth, production and 
distribution methods of European traditionalists signaled an apparently clear demarcation 
within the international wine industry. There are, however, other organizational changes 
taking place at a subterranean level that will over the next decade increasingly obscure 
this demarcation. 
Being capital-intensive, the wine industry has for many years had a tendency to 
rationalize. Until recently, with a few exceptions, such rationalization has taken place at a 
national level, as the need for economies of scale in grape growth and production have 
encouraged the larger firms to ‘cannibalize’ those smaller firms with similar business 
organization and product style. For example, as the industry entered a period of rapid 
growth in Australia through the 1980s, a rash of takeovers and mergers took place. 
Mildara Wines took control of Yellowglen in 1984 and Krondorf in 1986 and then 
merged with Wolf Blass. Penfold’s was bought by Adsteam, as was Kaiser Stuhl in 1982 
and Wynn’s Seaview in 1985. Penfold’s itself then purchased Lindeman’s in 1990 while 
Hardys swallowed Rhinecastle and Chateau Reynella in 1982. In California Gallo and 
Mondavi were also securing more profitable small wineries, while in Canada, Vincor was 
doing the same.xlviii
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Globalization of Production and Distribution
During the late 1990s and certainly the first four years of the 21st century, mergers and 
strategic alliances within the industry have intensified. The more noticeable and profound 
change, however, is that these developments have become very much transnational in 
nature. The intense need for capital, the opportunity to source grapes (at competitive 
prices) from multiple areas and the buying power associated with size has led the larger 
wine firms to look for acquisitions beyond their shores. But perhaps more important 
driving forces behind this activity have been the need to capture the most innovative 
oenological techniques, key brands, markets and market share.xlix
Technology transfer
For some years the ubiquitous ‘flying winemaker’ has symbolized the international 
diffusion and uptake of eonological innovation. Primarily, this has taken the form of ‘in-
demand’ winemakers being contracted for a period of time (usually during vintage) to act 
as consultants or overseers for particular producers or group of producers. As consultants 
they provide advice on new techniques, quality measures, maceration, oak usage, among 
others and are held responsible by many in the industry for facilitating the rapid transfer 
of knowledge and technology.l In more extreme cases, this knowledge and technology 
transfer has been represented by complete operations that have been shipped from one 
country to another, with the purposes of servicing (for a fee) an entire winemaking 
region.li
Traditionally, such transfers have been one-directional. Whether it be through ‘flying 
winemakers’ or small operations, the traffic has largely been from the New to Old World. 
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The ability of New World producers to produce consistent quality at a reasonable price, 
incorporate the latest in hygiene and temperature controls, crushers, cepages and blends, 
build national brands and capture key price points with bold, fruit-driven products has 
attracted considerable attention from Europe. As Old World producers have lost market 
share they have been increasingly keen to access these advantages using the quickest, 
most cost-effective methods. Rather than developing costly, innovative techniques, they 
simply import them.lii To some extent, the practice is working. 
Mergers for markets and market share
Compounding the trend in technology transfer has been the quest for market share and 
the capture of key price points. The mergers and strategic alliances referred to include 
some of the world’s largest wine firms.liii As competition intensifies across key price 
points in key markets, further globalization of production and distribution has become an 
inevitable legacy. We have witnessed alliances between New World firms, Old World 
firms and most significantly, New and Old World firms. British based Allied Domecq has 
acquired champagne Perrier-Jouet and Stolichnaya, Diageo and France’s Pernod Ricard 
has purchased California’s Sterling Vineyards, Australia’s Fosters Brewing has 
purchased California’s Beringa Estate, Canada’s giant Vincor now has California’s R.H 
Phillips together with New Zealand’s Crawford brand.liv US Constellation Brands has 
purchased Australia’s BRL Hardy to become the world’s largest wine group and is in the 
process of absorbing US firm Mondavi, while establishing strategic alliances with 
France’s famous de Rothschild and purchasing 40% of Italy’s largest firm, Ruffino.lv
Previously, de Rothschild had established strategic alliances with Mondavi and US-based 
Gallo, who in 2005 has launched a bid for Allied Domecq. Another giant, France’s 
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LVMH (owner of Loius Vuitton, Moet and others) has recently purchased Western 
Australia’s Cape Mentelle, New Zealand’s Cloudy Bay and South Australia’s 
Mountadam, while Australia’s Fosters group has purchased Southcorp.lvi
When it is recognised that most, if not all of these major firms also have large stables of 
domestic wine firms the recent consolidation process has significant implications for the 
global wine industry. 
The diagram below provides an example of the interests held by one global wine firm. It 
should be noted that the ‘stable’ of BRL Hardy was provided to emphasise the domestic 
ownership links. Similar ‘stables’ could be included for each of the incorporated firms in 
the diagram.
Figure 1: Constellation Brands as an example of the global landscape
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True Globalization
In 2005 the international wine landscape is fluid. Over the coming decade this fluidity, a 
reduction in ownership diversity and increased homogeneity of product is expected to 
undermine the current New/Old World distinction. The wine industry is witnessing a true 
globalization, with the increasing internationalization of production, distribution and 
marketing. New World firms from California, Australia and New Zealand are merging to 
create flexible production capacity and streamlined distribution channels, but more 
interestingly, Old World firms from France and Italy in particular, are exploiting this 
same practice.lvii
The convergence of strategies
As cited above, a number of the larger European firms are, in one form or another, 
creating strategic alliances with New World firms in order to access their technology and 
most importantly, their markets. After a number of years of attempting unsuccessfully to 
recapture the more popular price points in major markets, these firms are now retaining 
their niche markets while aligning themselves with those firms that dominate the lower 
price points. Such a strategy allows them to maintain their icon or prestige image and at 
the same time build market share in the lucrative branded categories. Importantly, the 
strategy also represents a final acceptance of the consumer-driven approach and the value 
of the market in determining wine style.
Conversely, New World firms who have possibly focused for too long on the popular 
categories, are now targeting super-premium and icon categories in an attempt to counter 
allegations of bland, ‘industrial’ wine production.lviii One strategy is to ‘piggy-back’ the 
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more prestigious brands on their reputation in the popular categories. To a limited extent, 
this is working. Another strategy is to either purchase, or establish alliances with, the 
producers of iconic labels for immediate access to these high price points. 
As European firms are attempting to access New World markets and price points, New 
World firms are in turn striving to enter those price points long held by the Europeans. 
The fact that both are to some extent departing from their traditional strategies and 
exploring the other’s territory is a direct repercussion of globalized production and 
distribution. 
A New Paradigm
The interesting aspect of these strategies is the increasingly problematic nature of 
drawing distinctions between New and Old World wine industries. Blurring of these 
distinctions will dramatically change the international wine landscape and have far 
reaching implications for concepts such as branding and terroir. We may, for example, 
see a situation where national strategies such as ‘Brand Australia’ are replaced by 
focused firm and regional strategies.lix As consumers search for distinction in their choice 
of wine, regional branding, representing a collection of boutique and small wineries will 
attract greater acceptance and influence. Global wine firms will be forced to promote the 
regional and firm characteristics of their product in order to maintain customer loyalty. 
The future of terroir is more difficult to predict. First impressions suggest that it may lose 
relevance in a truly globalized environment. Because the trend is towards branded and 
varietal wine with easy to understand labels and clearly identifiable taste, the notion of 
terroir would appear more difficult to market. It is a notion that is based on the intricacies 
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of weather, soil type, ground slope, grapes and wine making ‘savoir-faire’, all of which 
provide wine with a unique personality. It is also a notion that because of its somewhat 
ambiguous nature lost favour throughout the 1990s. With a renewed focus on 
regionalization and localization, however, the complex natural components of terroir
may receive a new recognition. As Brian Croser maintains, in the restless search for 
excellence the concept of terroir will again find favour on a global scale.lx In fact, he 
argues strongly that it is a concept which could and should co-exist with blended 
commodity wines, with the respective markets complimenting each other.lxi
Globalization and the new Localization
It appears inevitable that the increasing globalization of wine will trigger a relative 
decline in the product’s national identity. If any one of the world’s larger wine firms is 
taken as an example of this globalization, the multi-dimensional supply chain becomes 
immediately obvious. Growth, production, distribution and marketing of the firm’s wine 
can take place simultaneously on several different continents with the supply chain of any 
one brand spreading across a number of geographically diverse countries. A relatively 
small number of firms globally have this type of supply chain capacity. However, these 
same firms account for a significant proportion of international trade. In an industry such 
as wine, where product identification, customer loyalty and branding are so closely 
interwoven, the legitimacy of national identity in such an environment is undermined. 
While sporadic drinkers’ purchase of wine is based largely on price, regular consumers 
need to identify with their product’s heritage, location and brand development. If that 
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same product is grown and produced in one place, and marketed under a parent firm in
another, its branding soon becomes meaningless. 
Globalization and the growing issue of brand identity, however, have placed the notion of 
localization at the center of attention. According to Enright:
Globalization can . . . allow firms and locations with specific sources of 
competitive advantage to exploit their advantages over ever wider geographic 
areas, often, though not always, at the expense of other areas.lxii
 While national identity is at risk of dilution in a global landscape, local or regional 
identity may well emerge as a new force. To some extent, this regional identity is already 
emerging in Australia, California and New Zealand and exists in France and Italy. In 
Australia, regions such as the Hunter, Clare, Barrossa, and Yarra Valleys are marketing 
themselves to the world and establishing their own brand identity. In California, the same 
is happening with the Napa and Sonoma regions, while in New Zealand the Malborough 
region markets itself as the producer of the country’s super-premium brands. In France 
there are the well known branded regions of Bordeaux, Burgundy and Champagne.
Localization and Clusters
The emergence of regionalism/localization is, in part, the outcome of increased 
‘clustering’ within wine industries, and very much related to this, the response of small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to global pressures.  Throughout much of the 
1990s in New World wine industries, the landscape was very uneven. Most New World 
industries comprised large numbers of boutique and small firms and a very small number 
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of large firms. These numbers were inversely related to their production and export 
capacity, with the largest 5-10 firms accounting for upwards of 80% of the national 
capacity and the many hundreds of small firms contributing to the remaining 20% or 
less.lxiii Although this distortion has continued into the new millennium, there are 
indications that it may not be a permanent condition.
Trends highlighted in the author’s previous studies and which appear to be emerging 
across a number of New World industries, point to the fact that wine firm clusters create 
a disproportionately positive influence.lxiv Infrastructure, knowledge flows, supply chains, 
research and education bodies, regulatory frameworks, advisory organizations and 
general firm interaction appear to be significantly more intense within these clusters than 
in non-cluster regions.lxv
The intense interaction within these clusters also appears to translate into the enhanced 
diffusion and uptake of innovation, marketing, distribution and importantly, exports.lxvi
The momentum appears to be self-sustaining. As the clusters have grown in size and 
complexity they in turn have attracted both new and re-locating firms. Large 
multinationals usually have either their head office or a large subsidiary based within 
these clusters, which provide a ‘learning environment’ for the participating boutique and 
small firms. An example of the above influences can be seen in the Australian context. In 
this geographically diverse wine industry there are perhaps seven major clusters located 
across five states. The most innovative of these clusters is located in South Australia, 
where all of the industry’s national intermediary, funding, regulatory, research, education 
and export bodies are also located.lxvii
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It is no coincidence that in terms of core innovation and export measures, firms in the 
South Australian wine cluster perform substantially better than either non-cluster firms or 
their counterparts in the industry’s less developed clusters.lxviii For example, 
approximately 78% of South Australian firms export compared to between 40% and 45% 
in the industry’s other clusters and approximately 20% of firms in non-cluster regions.lxix
In addition, they are almost twice as export intensive (exports as a ratio of total sales), 
export to more markets and are more geographically diverse in their export 
destinations.lxx In terms of innovation, these same South Australian firms access the 
industry’s research services at more than twice the rate of firms in other clusters (68% 
versus 32%), and almost seven times the rate of non-cluster firms (10%). Inter-firm 
collaboration is also substantially higher for South Australian firms, as is new product 
development, employee education levels, marketing and technical innovation.lxxi
We are witnessing these same positive influences in California’s Napa and Sonoma wine 
clusters, South Africa’s Stellenbosch region, New Zealand’s Malborough cluster and 
even in embryonic regions such as Canada’s Niagara wine region.lxxii Government, 
industry, public sector research organizations and a multitude of suppliers are co-locating 
partly by design and partly through a natural attraction to concentrated resources, in a 
new and innovative way. This new localization represents far more than simple co-
location. It represents a dynamic response to the new opportunities and pressures of an 
increasingly globalized industry. It is a form of localization that may well afford its 
participants access to focused research and development, targeted marketing and 
collective branding. The critical mass afforded by these clusters would also provide 
participants with similar ‘purchasing power’ to the industry’s multinationals, allowing 
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them to capture superior distribution channels and super-premium to icon price points 
with adequate shelf space.
Rather than being an industry in which the small and medium sized firm faced extinction, 
or at best, a tenuous existence as predicted by many during the 1990s, this emerging 
landscape may well reconfigure the positioning and influence of these firms and as a 
result, their market share.lxxiii We may indeed witness a global wine landscape without 
national boundaries or identities but instead, punctuated by significant pockets of 
localized production and branding. 
Policy implications
If this is the case, it will also make sense for a reconfiguration of industry policy towards 
region and firm specific extension, export and marketing programs. A redistribution of 
national funding would also appear appropriate.lxxiv The current funding mechanisms in 
Australia, for example, are based on growth and production, which in practice means that 
the majority of resources are directed towards the largest firms. As globalization of 
ownership increases, a significant proportion of these resources will be dedicated to firms 
whose ownership is actually located outside the industry. Zhao argues that on a cost-
benefit analysis R&D funding from Australia’s Grape and Wine Research and 
Development Corporation disproportionately benefits overseas consumers over domestic 
consumers.lxxv This is true, but she has failed to recognize the more serious issue of 
producer R&D costs and technology benefits. For a number of the New World’s major 
producers who are owned by international interests the domestic R&D levies create a 
substantial flow-on effect in terms of technology transfer to the parent firm. For example, 
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in Australia the Hardy Group is Australia’s 2nd largest producer and largest exporter. Yet 
this firm is owned by Constellation, a US firm, whose export profits and technological 
innovations return to the US. 
This complex nature of ownership and industry dynamics needs to be understood more 
fully by policy makers if domestic industries are to reap the benefits of public sector 
initiatives and targeted schemes. Historically, there has been a growing dichotomy 
between rhetorical and actual support for domestic SME firms; increased support for the 
larger multinational firms (through greater participation in decision making and enhanced 
access to specific R&D) has naturally led to a restriction of access to available resources 
for those firms with limited capacity. Due to sheer numbers, a tendency to cluster, their 
growth trajectories and their experimental capacity small to medium enterprises represent 
the ‘next wave’ in the industry’s production and export capacity. These firms are region-
specific rather than global in nature and as such, require the same industry priorities, 
milestones and focused support that was awarded their larger counterparts during the 
1980s and 1990s. Industry vision within each producer nation must now be oriented 
towards that firm sector which best represents its interests. In a global environment, it 
appears that the distillation of these interests will more and more occur at a regional or 
local level. 
Concluding remarks
In terms of a consistently evolving and developing industry sector the international wine 
industry presents a near perfect case study. Unlike many sectors, it has experienced very 
few static phases. Instead, we have witnessed over the last two centuries at least, an 
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industry whose progression has been sometimes steady, but often rapid with rather 
dramatic innovations and direction changes.
From the domination of the industry by European producers through the 19th and much of 
the 20th century, to a democratization of wine culture and the emergence of New World 
‘players’, to the current reconfiguration of global production and distribution, the wine 
story is one punctuated by significant paradigm shifts. It is a story that continues into the 
new millennium, encompassing the issues of technology transfer, branding and the 
implications of mergers and alliances. Most importantly, however, it is a story that now 
carries with it possibly the most profound paradigm shift the industry has yet to 
experience. With the escalation of global production and distribution as well as the race 
for market share within the industry, New and Old World distinctions will continue to 
blur and may even disappear in the coming decade. In short, the global wine landscape 
will undergo irrevocable reconfiguration. This article has speculated on the 
organizational implications of that reconfiguration and the emerging role for localized 
branding and small to medium enterprises.
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